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FOR OF ALL SAD WORDS OF TONGUE OR PEN, THE
SADDEST ARE “IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN”1
Katherine Kelly†
Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down
2
Culture and Control Creativity. By Lawrence Lessig. Penguin Press,
2004. 348 pages, $24.95
Copyright law, more than any other body of law, has evolved
over the past two decades in a manner that profoundly affects
America’s culture. Two actions, taken eleven years apart, have
combined to lock up the elements of creative expression. On
March 1, 1989, the U.S. joined the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works after over a century of
3
resistance. In order for the U.S. to join the Berne Convention,
4
several modifications to U.S. law were required.
The most
sweeping was the elimination of copyright formalities, compliance
with which was required for an author to obtain a copyright on his
5
or her work. One such example was the notice requirement, such
as placing a circle “c” (©) and the year on the work in order to
6
inform others that the author claims a copyright in the work. As a
1. JOHN GREENLEAF WHITTIER, MAUD MULLER (1867).
† Associate at Heins Mills & Olson P.L.C. J.D., William Mitchell College of
Law, 2004; B.S., University of Minnesota, 2001.
2. Lawrence Lessig is a Professor of Law at Stanford Law School and
founder of the school’s Center for Internet and Society.
3. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102
Stat. 2853 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of title 17, U.S. Code). The Berne
Convention was signed at Berne, Switzerland, on September 9, 1886. Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 25
U.S.T. 1341 (entered into force July 10, 1971) [hereinafter Berne].
4. Many of the changes occurred prior to, and in anticipation of, joining
Berne.
5. Formalities are technical administrative rules that must be satisfied to
receive copyright protection. See U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 454 (1985-86)
(referring to the WIPO Glossary of the Terms of the Law of Copyright and
Neighboring Rights).
6. Publication of a work without satisfying the notice requirements
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result of this change, all copyrightable works, regardless of the
author’s intent, are now protected under copyright law.
The second modification to copyright law came in 1998 when
Congress, with the enactment of the Sonny Bono Copyright
Extension Act (“CTEA”), extended the term of existing and future
copyrights by twenty years in order to match Europe’s copyright
7
term. Works that were on the precipice of release into the public
domain, an intellectual soup from which anyone could draw for use
in their creative endeavors, were granted an additional twenty years
8
of copyright protection. Although only two percent of the works
whose copyrights were about to expire were commercially viable,
the extension applied to every work that was under copyright at
9
that time. An effect of this extension is that the other ninety-eight
percent of the works whose copyrights were extended, the vast
majority of which remain out of print, are out of reach of libraries
10
and entrepreneurs who could give them a new life.
constitutes an abandonment of a copyright and dedication to the public. 17
U.S.C.A. § 19 (1909). Another example of a formality was the requirement that a
copy of the work be sent to the Library of Congress, although this was not a
condition of copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 407 (1909). Currently, registering with the
Copyright Office is required only to file an infringement suit. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)
(2004).
7. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102,
112 Stat. 2827, 2827-28 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter CTEA]. The CTEA made U.S. copyright terms the same duration as
European Union terms, which are twenty years longer than Berne requires. “The
term of protection granted by this Convention shall be the life of the author and
fifty years after his death.” Berne, supra note 3, art. 7, para. 1.
8. Section 302 was amended “by striking ‘fifty’ each place it appears and
inserting ‘70’.” CTEA, supra note 7, § 102. Free Culture points out that “in the
twenty years after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue of the
expiration of a copyright term.” LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA
USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
134-35 (2004) [hereinafter FREE CULTURE].
9. FREE CULTURE, supra note 8, at 221. Using historic figures, the
Congressional Research Service estimated 2.34 percent of renewed works continue
to earn a commercial royalty. See Brief of Petitioners at 7, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), reh’g denied, 538 U.S. 916 (2003), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/open ing-brief.pdf,
or at 2002 WL 1041928.
10. The extension is literally a death sentence for many of the works:
“Thousands of old movies sit on shelves deteriorating because
the companies that hold the copyrights make no efforts to
restore them or make them available, while their copyright
status prevents others from preserving such works. By the time
many of these works are finally available to enter the public
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A third event transpired in the past two decades—although
not a result of copyright law—that had a profound effect on
culture. Even though the abolishment of formalities and the
extension of copyright terms restricted what entered the public
domain, what was already there became immensely accessible with
the advent of the Internet. With unprecedented ease, almost
everyone in the U.S. can access many of the works in the public
domain and adapt them, expand upon them, and then share them
with others with the same ease. As the Internet creates a new level
of access to culture, copyright law threatens to starve the public
domain so that what is accessible is very slim. In an economy with
an anorexic public domain, creativity that draws from prior works
can be afforded only by established and powerful businesses. The
discord between ease of access and legal inaccessibility is the
impetus for Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to
Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity (“Free Culture”), an
impassioned book on how media companies have manipulated
technology and the law in direct response to the Internet; a
response that “has massively increased the effective regulation of
11
creativity in America.”
Free Culture opens with the invention of the airplane, a
technology where the sky was, literally, the limit. It brought
previously unimagined access to faraway reaches and to new
people. The story quickly centers on the Causbys, North Carolina
farmers, who, along with the rest of the country, believed that their
12
property rights extended upwards, as far up as they cared to claim.
In 1945, the Causbys brought an action for trespass when military
13
aircraft so distressed their chickens that they fatally flew into walls.

domain, prints and negatives will have physically disintegrated.
These endangered works include not only film ‘classics,’ but
also industrial films, forgotten examples of silent cinema,
footage from uncompleted projects (such as Orson Welles’ Don
Quixote), and kinescopes of programs from the ‘golden age’ of
television.”
Brief of Amici Curiae American Association of Law Libraries et al. at 61-62, Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), reh’g denied, 538 U.S. 916 (2003),
available at 2001 WL 34092059.
11. FREE CULTURE, supra note 8, at 10.
12. Id. at 2.
13. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 258 (1946). The airplanes flew
approximately sixty-seven feet above their home on the landing approach, with as
many as six to ten chickens dying in one day and as many as 150 chickens dying
altogether. Id. at 258-59.
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The Supreme Court declared the doctrine of common law
14
ownership of land extending upwards forever to be dead. Private
claims to the airspace would transfer the air highways, to which
15
only the public has a right, into private ownership. Lessig uses
this story to highlight what he calls the “special genius of a
common law system:” The law adjusts, sometimes overnight, to new
16
technologies. Of course, the story also represents an anecdote to
the current conflict between creative content owners (the property
owners, like the Causbys) and the public highway that is the
Internet.
The first two sections of Free Culture focus on the essence of the
book, how culture is being tied up by private ownership. The
premise of Free Culture is that extremism against “piracy” and the
push to protect intellectual property as strongly as if it were real
property produce a fundamental change in how our culture is
made and shared. To illustrate the American tradition of using
existing works to create further works, Lessig describes the
emergence of one of the biggest creators of derivative works, the
Walt Disney Company. This is one of Free Culture’s best qualities,
the illustration of how copyright and culture have been intertwined
since the beginning of American media. Lessig describes the
method of taking from the public domain and building upon it as
17
“Walt Disney creativity.” Disney has issued at least seventeen films
18
that are adapted from public domain works.
Walt Disney
creativity, Lessig tells us, is exactly the type of creativity for which
the public domain exists; to inspire and allow the public to create
further works. However, this type of creativity is now on indefinite
hold due to copyright extensions, of which there have been eleven
19
in the past forty years. During Walt Disney’s lifetime, and until
20
1978, the average copyright term was at most thirty-two years.
Today, all copyright terms last the life of the author plus an
21
additional seventy years. Lessig writes that the public domain of

14. Id. at 260-61. “It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the
land extended to the periphery of the universe…. But that doctrine has no place
in the modern world.” Id.
15. Id. at 261.
16. FREE CULTURE, supra note 8, at 3.
17. Id. at 24.
18. For instance, Snow White, Pinocchio, Peter Pan, and Robin Hood.
19. FREE CULTURE, supra note 8, at 134.
20. Id. at 24.
21. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976).
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today consists of essentially the same works that Walt Disney was
22
able to access.
Walt Disney creativity is not limited to cartoons, however. Free
Culture goes on to illustrate other types of borrowing and copying,
such as the advent of photography (which borrowed an image from
23
24
the subject), media labs in schools, weblogs on the Internet
25
26
(“blogs”), and open source software. All of these adaptations
involve “tinkering” with existing works, whether music, art, or even
algorithms. Increasingly, the Internet is becoming the playground
of developing minds, minds that will expand through the
adaptation of existing works. Lessig states: “We’re building a
technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes moving images
and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an opportunity
to spread that creativity everywhere. But we’re building the law to
27
close down that technology.”
Free Culture is full of details that often are not brought to the
public’s attention when news breaks. One example in the book
details an information technology freshman’s run-in with a Goliath
of the content-owning industry, the Recording Industry Association
of America (“RIAA”).
The student, Jesse Jordan, made
improvements to his university’s intranet search engine, primarily
by compensating for a Microsoft bug that could cause a user’s

22. Although Free Culture states that “the public domain is presumptive only
for content from before the Great Depression,” copyrights have expired since
then. FREE CULTURE, supra note 8, at 25. Works before 1962 may have expired for
failure to renew copyright because Congress only extended terms for existing
copyrights beginning in 1962. Pub. L. No. 87-668, 76 Stat. 555 (1962).
23. FREE CULTURE, supra note 8, at 31.
24. Id. at 35. Just Think is a mobile project that enables children to make
films with high-tech digital equipment as a way to understand and critique the
filmed culture that bombards them. The project promotes media literacy as a key
means of countering media stereotyping and targets under-resourced, low-income
areas. For more information, see http://www.justthink.org (last visited April 15,
2004).
25. Id. at 40-41. Lessig states that blog “entries are relatively short; they point
directly to words used by others, criticizing with or adding to them. They are
arguably the most important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we
have.” Id. at 41.
26. Id. at 45-46. Open source software is a program in which the source code
is available free of charge to the general public for use and modification from its
original design. Open source code is usually created collaboratively, whereby
programmers share changes within their community. An example is Apache, the
most popular Internet server software currently in use.
See
http://httpd.apache.org.
27. FREE CULTURE, supra note 8, at 47.
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28

computer to crash.
Fairly quickly, the index of his system
contained more than a million files, including pictures, text, movie
29
clips, and music. Of course, the music files—which comprised
about 25 percent of the listed content on the directory—caught the
30
Unfortunately for Jesse, copyright law
attention of the RIAA.
provides for liability even when the defendant did not violate any
31
copyright statutes.
Case law has created a judicial doctrine of
copyright contributory liability, which requires only knowledge of
infringing activity, and inducing, causing, or materially
32
contributing to infringing conducts of others. Undoubtedly, Jesse
knew that someone, somewhere on campus had used the engine to
33
look for and transfer a music file that was under copyright.
Knowledge of that transfer, combined with his having created the
engine (his material contribution) created a presumption of
contributory liability, regardless of his legitimate purpose in
creating the engine. To compound his misfortune, copyright law
provides for statutory damages between $750 and $30,000 per
34
violation, as well as attorneys’ fees to the copyright holder. Lessig
compellingly tells this story from Jesse’s point of view. Although
lawyers may want more detailed legal analysis, Free Culture is
accessible to all audiences precisely because Lessig is able to
simplify copyright’s sometimes dense rules. Free Culture illustrates
what attorneys too often overlook: a layperson’s point of view when
28. Id. at 49
29. Id. at 49-50.
30. Id. at 50.
31. Assuming that Jesse did not transfer copyrighted material himself, he did
not violate the copyright statute because contributory infringement is a judicial
doctrine. “Although the liability provision of the 1976 Act provides simply that
‘[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner ... is an
infringer of the copyright,’ 17 U.S.C. § 501(a), the House and Senate Reports
demonstrate that Congress intended to retain judicial doctrines of contributory
infringement.” Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774,
812 (1984) (citing S. REP. NO. 57 (1975); H.R. REP. NO. 61 (1976)).
32. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
33. Transferring a file necessarily entails copying the file. See MAI Sys. Corp.
v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) (loading copyrighted
software into RAM creates a copy of that software in violation of the Copyright
Act).
34. 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(c)(1), 505 (2004). Although “[i]n a case where the
infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer
was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an
infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of
statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200.” Id. § 504(c)(2).
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faced with a lawsuit such as this. Jesse could either defend himself
at a cost of at least $250,000 or settle for the amount that the RIAA
35
offered, Jesse’s life’s savings of $12,000. Lessig is disgusted: “Our
law is an awful system for defending rights. It is an embarrassment
to our tradition. And the consequence of our law as it is, is that
those with the power can use the law to quash any rights they
36
oppose.”
One of Free Culture’s best attributes is Lessig’s ability to
illustrate the difference between what is technically legal and what
is practical. One chapter details a documentary filmmaker’s
37
burden when grappling with the difference between the two.
While filming a documentary on stagehands, a few seconds of the
television show The Simpsons was shown in the background of the
38
stagehands’ room while they were playing checkers.
Although
both Matt Groening (The Simpsons’ creator) and Gracie Films (the
show’s production company) told the filmmaker to go ahead and
use the shot, the purported copyright holder, Fox, demanded a
39
$10,000 licensing fee. As Lessig rightly points out, lawyers hear
this story and automatically reply that this use was a fair use and no
40
licensing fee needed to be paid. However, the book illustrates the
reality of relying upon fair use. Fair use is an expensive justification
for copying because it is an affirmative defense, where the burden
41
of proof lies on the defendant. With this example, Free Culture
articulates the reality of film production: film insurance carriers
dislike releasing works if there are portions with rights that have
42
not been cleared. Can we blame them? Relying on a fair use
35. FREE CULTURE, supra note 8, at 51-52. Notice that Jesse may have to pay
the RIAA’s attorney’s fees if he loses, but would be unable to receive his attorney’s
fees if he won. All he would receive from the litigation is his cleared name. See 17
U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2004).
36. FREE CULTURE, supra note 8, at 200.
37. Id. at 95.
38. Id. at 95.
39. Id. at 96. This licensing fee was their discounted, educational rate to
boot. Id.
40. Id. at 97.
41. “[F]air use . . . is not an infringement of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 107
(2004). The burden of proof is on the copier because fair use is an affirmative
defense. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
42. FREE CULTURE, supra note 8, at 98. “Television distribution and broadcast
agreements require that an insurance policy be in place to protect all of the
parties in the production/distribution chain, in the event of reasonable mistakes,
errors and omissions during production that result in copyright infringements or
the unauthorized use of protected materials (Errors and Omissions insurance).”
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defense in copyright litigation can be very expensive, and carries
with it the possibility that the defense will be unsuccessful, leading
43
to statutory damages.
Free Culture goes on to note that all the changes in content
control would not matter except for the recent trend of media
44
concentration.
Because only a handful of companies get to
decide what content to provide, the opportunity for discussion of
topics that the non-majority cares to discuss can be curtailed. Free
Culture states:
Given (1) the power of technology to supplement the
law’s control, and (2) the power of concentrated markets
to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
the massively expanded “property” rights granted by
copyright fundamentally changes the freedom within this
culture to cultivate and build upon our past, then we have
45
to ask whether this property should be redefined.
This is a profound and grand statement, that “property should
be redefined.” However, this is where Free Culture comes up short.
Just as the reader is realizing that, yes, property should be redefined,
she is left with no further suggestion of how. Even in the Afterward,
where a few recommendations are made, there is no mention of a
new copyright paradigm.
Instead of ignoring the other side of the political spectrum, for
public domain advocates tend to be leftward leaning, Free Culture
demonstrates how even conservatives should be concerned with the
current trend. One chapter refers to content-collection sites on the
Web, such as those that offer plot summaries from forgotten
46
television shows or collect cartoons from the 1980s.
The
copyright owners are no longer interested in offering He-Man
cartoons or Thundercats plot lines, yet there is a huge interest in rediscovering these works among Generation Xers. As the book tells
us,
as the law is currently crafted, this work is presumptively
illegal, . . . [which] will increasingly chill creativity, as the
examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements
Copyright Clearing House, Inc., Multimedia 1997: Protecting Your Client's Legal and
Business Interests: A Guide to Clearing Music in Audio/Visual Multimedia Products, 467
PLI/Pat 783, 787 (1997).
43. See discussion supra note 41.
44. FREE CULTURE, supra note 8, at 162.
45. Id. at 169.
46. Id. at 183.
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continue to proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear
sense of what’s allowed and what’s not, and at the same
time, the penalties for crossing the line are astonishingly
47
harsh.
As shown in previous chapters, the consequences of legal
uncertainty could influence website creators into not taking the
risk of posting the content. The uncertain legality of their actions
makes it unreasonable for most businesses to rely on fair use and
the public domain, limiting use to only those sites that can afford
to pay for rights or defend a lawsuit if one arises. As the book
points out, the stories about silenced artists may fall on deaf ears of
corporate-oriented, conservative policy makers. However, even
they should sit up and take notice when the business market is
being regulated by this ambiguous legal and technical system. As
an illustration, this section tells how attorneys and venture capitalist
firms are not immune from the murky copyright system. After
MP3.com, a website that relied on fair use to distribute CD holders’
own music to them over the Internet, was sued and shut down, one
of the plaintiffs in the suit, Vivendi, purchased MP3.com and filed a
malpractice suit against their legal advisors. The suit alleged that it
was malpractice to advise that MP3.com had a good-faith claim that
48
the service they offered would be legal under copyright law. This
suit sent exactly the message that the content industry wanted to
send: do not even dare advise that fair use is an option. Even
venture capitalists are subject to attacks if they invest in enterprises
49
that rely on fair use.
Unfortunately, this chapter then flows back into discussion of
how the fuzzy boundaries of fair use and the public domain will
affect creativity, when further analysis on the effect on the business
world is needed. Lessig mentions that a free market and free
culture depend upon vibrant competition, but he doesn’t elaborate
on the impact to the free market system. Free Culture makes an
effort to appeal to conservative and economic-minded people, but
it could do more.
The most compelling section, and probably the most
interesting to attorneys, gets to the reason why Free Culture was
written: to explain Lessig’s trek to the Supreme Court and his fight
47. Id. at 185.
48. Id. at 190. The case was settled for an unspecified amount. Id.
49. Id. at 191 (describing such a lawsuit brought by two record companies
against venture capital firm Hummer Winblad).
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51

to win the Eldred v. Ashcroft case. This is the strongest portion of
the book because it is the most passionate, heartfelt, and insightful.
The chapter opens with Eric Eldred, a retired computer
programmer who wanted to create an online library of public
domain novels with links to pictures and explanatory text to make
52
the stories come alive. One of the novels he wanted to include
53
was just about to enter the public domain. However, at just that
time, Congress extended, for the eleventh time in forty years, the
term of all copyrights for an additional twenty years. “Eldred would
not be free to add any works more recent than 1923 to his
54
collection until 2019.” Lessig, as a constitutional scholar, became
involved in Eldred’s battle due to the source of Congress’ power to
55
extend the copyright term, the Progress Clause.
Where most
clauses give Congress the power to do something, the Progress
Clause dictates the goal of the power and how it is to be used: “to
56
promote progress by securing exclusive rights for limited times.” In all
other provisions, the Constitution is silent on the means by which
57
Congress must exercise its authority. If Congress has the power to
extend existing terms, Lessig reasoned, then the requirement that
the terms be “limited” will have no effect, and Congress is violating
the means by which it must exercise its authority under the
58
Progress Clause.
In January of 1999, Lessig and his team filed a lawsuit on
Eldred’s behalf in Washington, D.C. federal district court, asking
59
the court to declare the CTEA unconstitutional. When they made
it to the Supreme Court, however, the CTEA was held
constitutional, and a section of the book discusses why Lessig thinks
the Court did so. He begins the story with his heart on his sleeve,

50. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
51. FREE CULTURE, supra note 8, at 213.
52. Id.
53. Robert Frost’s New Hampshire.
54. FREE CULTURE, supra note 8, at 214. However, this is an overstatement
since there have been works that fell into the public domain prior to 1961. See
discussion supra note 22.
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. Edward C. Walterscheid, Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits
and the Intellectual Property Clause, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315, 316 (2000) (“It appears
that this was deliberate and that other attempts to grant specific as opposed to
general powers to Congress were rejected by the delegates.”).
58. FREE CULTURE, supra note 8, at 215-16.
59. Id. at 228.
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writing “[i]t is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
60
astonishingly hard.”
After the Court’s decision, Lessig turned to an argument of
politics. He wrote a newspaper article in which he proposed a fix
to the problems of orphaned works and the anorexic public
61
domain. Under his plan, fifty years after publication, a copyright
owner would be required to register the work and pay a minimal
fee. If the fee was not paid the work would pass into the public
domain. A registration system, as well as the notice requirement,
was how works passed into the public domain before the 1976 Act.
Although those requirements were draconian, requiring only a
minimal fee and registration fifty years after creation is far from
burdensome. Lessig points out that if a work is not worth
registering to get an extended term, then it is not worthwhile for
the government to defend a monopoly on that work at the public’s
62
expense. A simple, possibly web-based, system could move up to
98 percent of once-commercial work into the public domain within
63
fifty years. However, the reason that the U.S. does not currently
have a registration requirement is because of an international
treaty, Berne. A bill proposing such a system, called the Public
Domain Enhancement Act, was introduced in Congress by Rep.
64
Lofgren.
Lessig writes that this bill “solved any problem with
international law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon
65
copyright owners possible.” However, it is not the bill’s proposed
simple requirements that render it compliant with Berne because
66
Berne mandates that there be absolutely no formalities. The bill
accords with Berne because it does not impose formalities on works
created outside the United States. Berne allows a country to

60. Id. at 229.
61. Lawrence Lessig, Protecting Mickey Mouse at Art’s Expense, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 2003, at A17. Orphaned works are works where the copyright owners cannot
be ascertained, but that are still under copyright. Using orphaned works, or even
restoring them if they are deteriorating, is a violation of copyright law. See, e.g.,
Kahle v. Ashcroft Submission Site, at http://notabug.com/kahle. The Kahle v.
Ashcroft Submission Site solicits examples of orphaned works to support the
plaintiff’s case in a lawsuit pending before the Northern District of California.
62. FREE CULTURE, supra note 8, at 252.
63. Id. at 253. Many endorsed the idea, including Steve Forbes. Id. at 249.
64. H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. (2003).
65. FREE CULTURE, supra note 8, at 253.
66. Berne requires member states to ensure that the enjoyment and exercise
of copyright rights “shall not be subject to any formality.” Berne, supra note 3, art.
5(2).
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impose formalities on its own citizens, but not on citizens of other
67
Berne member countries. Although this bill appears unfeasible
from a political standpoint, Free Culture is more concerned with
making the reader recognize the idea that our current system is
harmful to our culture than with supplying specific answers
compliant with international law.
The last chapter, “Fire Lots of Lawyers,” is a misnomer, for
Lessig does not advocate for a reduction in the number of lawyers
but instead encourages lawyers to “consider it their duty to change
the way the law works—or better, to change the law so that it
68
works.” To be realistic, a chapter titled “Fire Lots of Lawyers” is
probably more popular with the intended audience than “Lawyers
Rethink Your Duty.” However, further suggestions to the legal
community could potentially affect a more significant change in
the current copyright regime; but the book gives short shrift to this
topic.
Free Culture is a passionate appeal to the public to wake up and
recognize the collective harm to culture resulting from the various
legal and technological locks on creative work. Luckily, Lessig’s
passion does not lead to overly dramatic and legally complex
scenarios for the end of the world. Instead, it is written for the
layperson and filled with humorous anecdotes. From the story of
RCA’s efforts to crush FM radio, to jazz-dancing robotic dogs,
69
Japanese comics, and the Marx Brothers, Lessig conveys how
content creators are mired in an overly controlling business and
legal system. Through simple explanations of copyright law’s
sometimes opaque doctrines, Lessig articulates why our culture is at
risk of being plundered and why our public domain is starving.
Although too limited on the topic of how the complicated and
multi-layered problem of big media’s influence can be fixed, Free
Culture is an engaging and entertaining book that illustrates the
tragic fact that the content industry is far more concerned with
control and profits than creativity, expression, or constitutional
rights.

67. Id. art. 5(1). “Berne does not forbid its members to impose formalities
on works first published on its own territory.” S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 18 (1988).
68. FREE CULTURE, supra note 8, at 305.
69. When the Warner Brothers threatened to sue the Marx brothers over a
parody of Casablanca, the Marx Brothers told them to watch out because the Marx
brothers “were brothers long before you were!” Id. at 147-48.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss2/14

12

